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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that low-income households spend a high
share of their income on pollution-intensive goods. This fuels the con-
cern that an environmental tax reform could be regressive. We employ a
framework which accounts for the distributional effect of environmental
taxes and the recycling of the revenues on both households and firms to
quantify changes in the optimal tax structure and the equity impacts of
an environmental tax reform. We characterize when an optimal environ-
mental tax reform does not increase inequality, even if the tax system
before the reform is optimal from a non-environmental point of view.
If the tax system before the reform is calibrated to stylized data – and
is thus non-optimal – we find that there is a large scope for inequality
reduction, even if the government is restricted in its recycling options.
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1 Introduction
A widespread reservation against environmental taxation is that this policy
might increase inequality (Bento et al., 2005; Bento, 2013; Wier et al., 2005)
at least in developed countries.1 A major reason why this policy is considered
regressive is that poor households spend a larger fraction of their income on
pollution-intensive goods than rich households. This is reminiscent of Engel
(1857)’s work on subsistence levels of food consumption. In principle, the
environmental tax revenue can be recycled in a progressive way. However, it is
unclear to what extent the recycling of the tax revenue can offset the regressive
effect of the tax itself.
The main novelty of this article is that we quantify the distributional effect
of optimal environmental tax reforms. We also compare different recycling
mechanisms for environmental tax revenue in terms of their equity implica-
tions. For this purpose, we analyze an increase in regressive environmental
taxes which is induced by a change in preferences for environmental quality.
We assume that the government has different options for recycling the tax rev-
enue such as linear/non-linear income tax cuts and uniform lump-sum trans-
fers. We determine the distributional effects of such a tax reform by comparing
different economic variables before and after the tax reform in two settings:
first, in a setting in which taxes are set optimally before the tax reform (from a
non-environmental point of view); second, in a calibrated setting in which the
initial tax system is suboptimal. We find that the overall distributional impact
of such a reform depends on the initial tax structure and the available revenue
recycling options.
Specifically, our main findings are: (i) If the pre-existing tax system is
optimal, the regressive effect of the environmental tax can be largely or even
completely offset by the recycling of the tax revenue: an environmental tax
reform is even slightly progressive if the government can use a combination
of lump-sum transfers and non-linear income tax cuts to redistribute the tax
revenue. If uniform lump-sum transfers are unavailable for redistribution, the
tax reform is slightly regressive. (ii) If the pre-existing tax system is non-
optimal, an environmental tax reform can have a large scope for inequality
reduction.
In the cases in which inequality is reduced through an environmental tax
reform, we talk about a double dividend of redistribution. Our double divi-
dend of redistribution, however, is different from the classical double dividend
(Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg, 1999).2 The reason is that in a setting with hetero-
geneous households, the classical double dividend is of limited interest, since
constraining the government to using either income tax cuts or uniform lump-
sum transfers for revenue recycling will inevitably lead to welfare losses. In
fact, we show that an optimal environmental tax reform requires adjustments
in both lump-sum and income taxes.
1We are only concerned with the (intra-generational) distribution between different house-
holds at a given point in time, since increased intra-generational inequality is one of the most
commonly used arguments against environmental policy (Combet et al., 2010; Ekins, 1999).
For an article that considers both intra- and inter-generational distributional effects of environ-
mental taxation see Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2010).
2In this strand of literature it is argued that using environmental tax revenue for reducing
distorting taxes might lead to a reduction in the gross costs of an environmental tax reform,
compared to lump-sum recycling (Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg, 1999).
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There are two separate strands of literature which analyze questions of
(optimal) taxation and distribution in the presence of (environmental) exter-
nalities: First, the optimal taxation literature, which models pollution as a
by-product of the consumption of polluting goods and an environmental tax
hence as a tax on the polluting commodity. Models in this strand of the litera-
ture assume linear production functions which lead to constant prices (with the
exception of Cremer and Gahvari 2001). The second strand analyzes the effect
of increased environmental taxes on factor prices (and sometimes on the distri-
bution between heterogeneous households). These publications, however, are
not concerned with the optimality of the tax system.
The optimal taxation literature analyzes questions such as under what con-
ditions the second-best externality tax can be set to the first-best Pigouvian
level, when it suffices to set linear corrective taxes, if income and commod-
ity taxes can be formulated independently of externality-correcting taxes3 and
if the optimal (income, commodity and environmental) tax rules change in a
second-best setting. This literature, however, does not make statements about
the distributional effects of an optimal environmental tax reform.
The conclusions from these studies differ, depending on the tax instru-
ments available to the government: Jacobs and De Mooij (2015) show that
when the income and the externality tax are both linear or both non-linear, and
uniform lump-sum taxes are available, the government should set the external-
ity tax at its Pigouvian level; optimal income and optimal environmental taxes
can be determined independently.4 Cremer et al. (1998) demonstrate, in a set-
ting in which uniform lump-sum transfers are not available, that this does not
hold anymore for the combination of linear externality taxes with non-linear
income taxes and that the additivity property breaks down in this case. Still
excluding price effects, Kaplow (2012) analyzes different environmental tax
reform designs under equity constraints.
When the production side is accounted for explicitly, as is done in the
second strand of the literature, substitution effects between pollution and other
factors of production occur, that do not exist when prices are assumed to be
constant (Fullerton et al., 2001; Dissou and Siddiqui, 2014). In fact, Fullerton
and Heutel (2007, 2010) show that the incidence of an environmental tax on
the firm side can have strong distributional effects. Dissou and Siddiqui (2014)
demonstrate that these effects are likely to be progressive.
Both strands of literature have gained important insights, but they are also
of limited applicability: Regarding optimal taxation, statements about changes
in abstract tax rules and an exclusive focus on households do not suffice to
make quantitative statements about the distributional effects of environmental
tax reforms. On the other hand, models from the second strand of the liter-
ature often do not account for heterogeneous households (and thus for non-
linear income taxes) and they analyze tax reforms away from the optimum. If
they account for heterogeneity the latter point of critique still holds (Chiroleu-
3Sandmo (1975) called this principle the additivity property.
4This contribution and related research is centered around the question whether the marginal
cost of public funds equals unity or not. Kaplow (2004) was the first to argue that these are
indeed equal to one, if Mirrleesian income taxes and optimal public good supply are set si-
multaneously. Jacobs and De Mooij (2015) extend Kaplow’s thesis to the case of Pigouvian
taxes combined with optimal income distribution. This holds when uniform lump-sum transfers
are available to the government, in which case there are no environmental double dividends
possible.
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Assouline and Fodha, 2014; Fullerton and Monti, 2013; Klenert and Mattauch,
2016).
Our study bridges the gap between these two strands: we present a hybrid
model in which the modeling of the household side is based on the first and the
modeling of the firm side is based on the second strand of the literature. The
government is modeled as a Stackelberg leader which anticipates the actions
of the other agents, while these agents take the policies imposed by the govern-
ment as given. Solving this model numerically, we illustrate the distributional
consequences of such a tax reform by quantifying the changes in the tax rates
and in inequality.
We use the following assumptions from the aforementioned studies, which
we consider the most empirically relevant, to extend the small analytical model
described in Klenert and Mattauch (2016) to a numerical model which includes
prices effects and determines optimal policies: First, as Fullerton and Heutel
(2007, 2010), we model pollution as a production input, and an environmental
tax hence as a tax on this input (and not on the polluting commodity). Second,
we focus on the case of a non-linear income tax combined with a linear tax
on pollution, to account for the redistributive role of income taxes and since
the pollution tax is levied directly in production. Third, we determine opti-
mal policies as in Cremer et al. (1998); Cremer and Gahvari (2001) and Ja-
cobs and De Mooij (2015). Finally, we focus on the case of a non-homothetic
utility function to reflect the empirical finding that poor households spend a
higher share of their income on pollution-intensive goods (Grainger and Kol-
stad, 2010; Levinson and O’Brien, 2015; Flues and Thomas, 2015). Note that
these findings mainly concern developed countries: in developing countries
an environmental tax can have a less regressive or even a progressive effect
(Sterner, 2011). The present study is the first to combine these assumptions.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: The model is outlined
in Section 2, which also includes subsections on the calibration of the model
and its numerical solution. We describe the adjustment in the optimal income
and lump-sum taxes that accompany an optimal environmental tax reform in
Section 3. In Section 4, we modify some of the modeling assumptions such
as the tax instruments available to the government, the assumption of non-
homothetic preferences and values of key parameters. In Section 5 we apply
the framework from the preceding sections to a calibrated economy. We show
that, if the pre-existing tax system is suboptimal, there is a large scope for
inequality reduction. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We use a two-sector general-equilibrium model with Mirrleesian income tax-
ation, in which N households are distinguished by their productivity. House-
holds consume two goods with different pollution intensities. There is a sub-
sistence level of polluting consumption, which we model with a Stone-Geary
utility function. Households derive utility from consumption of the two goods,
leisure and environmental quality. Individual households cannot affect pollu-
tion, so only the government can regulate it. Within this framework we assess
the distributional effects of an optimal environmental tax reform.
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Firms: There are two representative firms, one produces a clean consump-
tion good C, the other produces a polluting consumption good D. Pollution Z
is a by-product of production. We assume that production Fj (Tj,Z j), with
j ∈ {C,D}, is a function of pollution Z j and a resource Tj, which is bought
from the households.5 The resource Tj can, in our model, be interpreted as a
fixed amount of a tradable resource such as labor, land or capital. In that sense
leisure is the amount of this resource which is used at home. For the sake of
simplicity we will refer to the resource sold to the firm as labor and to the
resource used at home as leisure.
Firms produce with a constant returns to scale technology Fj (Tj,Z j), j ∈
{C,D}:
Fj (Tj,Z j) =
{
(ε jT rj + (1− ε j)Zrj )
( 1
r
)
, if Z j ≤ xTj
0, if Z j > xTj
(1)
with σ = 1/(1− r) being the elasticity of substitution between labor and
pollution Z j and ε j the factor share in the respective sectors. The additional
inequality (with x> 0) in the production function implies that the firms allocate
some of their labor to production and the rest to pollution abatement activities
(see Appendix A in Copeland and Taylor 1994 for more details). The firms
sell their good at price p j and pay wages w for the production factor Tj.
The firms choose their production factors so as to equalize factor payments
with marginal productivities:
w =
∂Fj (Tj,Z j)
∂Tj
(2)
and
τZ =
∂Fj (Tj,Z j)
∂Z j
, (3)
with τZ denoting a pollution tax levied by the government.
Households: Households are distinguished only in their productivity φi. There
are N households, ordered from 1 for lowest to N for highest productivity.
Households all have the same total time endowment T, which they can either
dedicate to leisure li or to production. Each household receives an after tax
income of
Ii = (1− τw,i)φiw(T − li). (4)
with τw,i representing non-linear income taxes, levied by the government.
We follow Ballard et al. (2005) in modeling the fact that households need a
minimal level of polluting consumption D0, with non-homothetic preferences.
All households have the same preferences and maximize the following utility
function:
Vi =U (Ci,Di, li)+E (Z) =Cαi (Di−D0)β lγi + (E0−ξ (ZC +ZD)θ ), (5)
with the environmental quality E(Z) being defined as
E (Z) = E0−ξ (Z)θ , with Z = ZC +ZD. (6)
5This is a common approach when assessing the equity and efficiency impacts of envi-
ronmental policy in a general equilibrium (see e.g. Fullerton and Heutel 2007; Fullerton and
Metcalf 2001; Copeland and Taylor 1994).
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E0 is the initial stock of environmental quality which suffers damages from
total pollution Z emitted in the production sectors.
The budget equation of each household is given by
Ci · pC +Di · pD = Ii +L. (7)
Here, L is a uniform lump-sum transfer (or, if negative, a linear lump-sum
tax).6 Each household chooses its leisure time share and consumption in both
goods to maximize the utility function with respect to the budget equation,
which yields the following first-order conditions:
(
∂Ui
∂Ci
)/(
∂Ui
∂Di
)
=
pC
pD
, (8)(
∂Ui
∂Di
)/(
∂Ui
∂ li
)
=
pD
(1− τw,i)φiw . (9)
Government: The government maximizes total welfare W, i.e. the sum of
all agents’ utilities:
W =
N
∑
i=1
V (Ci,Di, li,E). (10)
Taxes are primarily used to finance the government’s revenue requirement
G, which remains constant during the analysis. The government’s budget equa-
tion is thus given by:
G =−NL+
N
∑
i=1
τw,iφiw(T − li)+ τZ (ZC +ZD). (11)
We assume that the government is unable to observe the individual produc-
tivity of each household. To ensure that agent i prefers his bundle {Ci,Di, Ii}
to the bundles of all other agents j , i, we implement the following Mirrlees
(1971) type incentive compatibility constraint:
Ui ≥U ji . (12)
U ji is the utility of household i pretending to be household j. It is given by
U
(
C j,D j,T − I j(1− τw, j)φiw
)
. (13)
The optimal income tax system is a result of the welfare maximization and
the incentive constraints: the government chooses the income tax rates such
that there is some redistribution between agents (due to the utilitarian welfare
maximization), but not enough to destroy the agents’ incentives to work (due
to the incentive constraints).
6Following Jacobs and De Mooij (2015), we include uniform lump-sum transfers as a possi-
ble policy instrument. We analyze the case of a government restricted to income taxes in Section
4.1 and find that the uniform lump-sum transfers play a significant role in optimal taxation.
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Resource constraints and numeraire: The following resource constraints
apply:
TC +TD =
n
∑
i=1
φi(T − li), (14)
pC
n
∑
i=1
Ci +
1
2
G = FC pC, (15)
pD
n
∑
i=1
Di +
1
2
G = FD pD. (16)
The first equation describes the equilibrium on the labor market, while the last
two equations describe the equilibrium in the market for clean and polluting
goods. The government is assumed to consume equal shares of clean and
polluting goods. We set the price w of the production input Tj as the numeraire.
2.1 Calibration
For the simulations below we set N = 5. The individual productivities are
calibrated to match recent U.S. data on the income shares of different quintiles
(see Table 1).
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Productivity (φi) 0.03 0.0825 0.141 0.229 0.511
Table 1: The households’ productivities are calibrated to match data from the
U.S. Census Bureau on the income shares of different quintiles in the bench-
mark scenario (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2012)
The remaining parameters are chosen as displayed in Table 2. We choose
the clean and the polluting consumption shares in the utility function in relation
to the share of clean and polluting output produced (as do Fullerton and Heutel
2007 and Goulder et al. 1999). The polluting sector is more pollution-intensive
than the clean sector, which we assume to be almost pollution-free. We set D0
such that it is at 44 % of the mean polluting consumption level and at 62 %
of the polluting consumption level of the lowest income quintile before the tax
reform. Government spending G is set at roughly 24 % of the GDP before the
tax reform. We vary this value in Section 4.3 between 0 and 70 % of GDP and
find that it does not change the results qualitatively.
2.2 Solving numerically
We need to use numerical methods to solve the model for the following rea-
sons: First, we calibrate the model to stylized data on income distribution and
tax burden and calculate the change in optimal tax rates instead of tax rules to
quantify the distributional effects of an environmental tax reform. Second, we
model the production side to include price effects and an environmental tax as
a tax on pollution which occurs in the production sector. Third, the govern-
ment in our model acts as a Stackelberg leader, which means it anticipates the
actions of all other actors, including firms, while firms and households take the
actions of the government as given.
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Households
α clean consumption share in utility 0.7
β polluting cons. share in utility 0.2
γ leisure share in utility 0.2
D0 subsistence level poll. consumption 0.5
θ damage exponent 1.0
ξ pref. for env. quality 0.1
Firm
AC, AD total factor productivity 1
εC labor intensity clean production 0.995
εD labor intensity poll. production 0.92
σ elast. of subs. btw. labor and pollution 0.5
Government
G government consumption 5
Table 2: Calibration of the model parameters
The variables Ci, Di, li, pC, pD, TC, TD, ZC, ZD, L, τZ and τw,i are de-
termined, in the general equilibrium, by the following optimization: We use
the algebraic modeling system GAMS (Rosenthal, 2014) to maximize total
welfare (10) subject to the government’s budget constraint (11), the incentive
constraints (12), the resource constraints (14)-(16) and to the first-order condi-
tions of the firms (2),(3) and the households (7)-(9), by varying the available
policy instruments.
2.3 Measures of distribution
Since the pollution tax is levied on the firm side, we need a measure of distri-
bution which also includes price effects on consumption goods and effects on
leisure, which occur when both leisure and pollution are an input in production.
Traditional measures such as the Gini coefficient in income are hence not suit-
able for our purpose. An alternative is calculating the Gini coeffient in utility:
this includes both price effects and changes in leisure levels. In the following,
whenever we refer to the Gini coefficient, we refer to the Gini coefficient in
utility. We use the non-environmental utility U for the calculation of the Gini
coefficient in order to separate the inequality-reducing effect of avoided dam-
ages from the distributional effect of the environmental tax incidence and the
revenue redistribution.7
3 Optimal environmental tax reform
In this section we determine the optimal mix of non-linear income taxes, uni-
form lump-sum transfers and (linear) taxes on the polluting production input
7Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994, 1996) use the terms “blue welfare” for the non-
environmental welfare component, and “green welfare” for the welfare component that de-
pends on the environmental quality, to make this important distinction. Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg (1996) and Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1999), further decompose welfare in a red and a
pink component which accrue to changes in public consumption and employment, respectively.
Since we assume constant government spending and full employment, there are no effects on
public consumption or employment in our model.
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before and after an increase in the preference parameter for environmental
quality ξ from zero to ξ > 0. This increase can, for instance, be interpreted as
new scientific evidence on the detrimental effects of pollution on well-being.
We call the adjustment of the policy instruments an optimal environmental tax
reform (ETR).
The government can adjust the optimal tax and transfer levels freely. This
setting is hence the most unrestricted one we analyze. In the subsequent sec-
tions we will gradually introduce more government constraints (non-availability
of lump-sum transfers in Section 4.1 and a suboptimal initial tax system and
fixed ETR designs in Section 5). By comparing these sections to the current
section the implication of each constraint becomes visible.
In this section, we obtain the following results: First, optimal income taxes
hardly react to a change in environmental preferences (see Figure 1, top left).
Second, most additional revenue is redistributed in a lump-sum fashion (see
Figure 1, top right). Third, the Gini coefficient decreases (see Figure 1, bottom
left) and fourth, the government shifts away from lump-sum towards environ-
mental taxes in the financing of its spending (see Figure 1, bottom right).
We first describe the economy before the tax reform. The fixed govern-
ment spending requirement is financed in large parts by lump-sum and income
taxes, which are set such that the incentive constraints are binding. A smaller
fraction is contributed by environmental taxes. Optimal environmental taxes
are greater than zero even in the case of ξ = 0 because only from a certain en-
vironmental tax threshold on the firm will reduce production in response to the
environmental tax. Even a government without a preference for environmental
quality sets the environmental tax just below this threshold level because this
does not distort production.8
We now detail the results: First, before ξ is increased, the income taxes
are adjusted such that welfare is maximized and the incentive constraints are
not violated. Due to the high marginal utility of consumption of low-income
households, we see high subsidies for low-income households and high-taxes
for high-income households. The income tax system hardly changes in re-
sponse to an ETR since a more progressive change in the tax system would
violate at least one of the incentive constraints (Figure 1, top left).
Second, lump-sum transfers are mainly a tool for balancing the govern-
ment’s budget: before the ETR they are negative. After the tax reform, when
the government can meet a large part of its spending requirements with envi-
ronmental taxes, lump-sum transfers are used for returning the excess revenue
to the households (Figure 1, top right). Since the income taxes are already
set such that the incentive constraints are binding, more redistribution is only
possible through lump-sum transfers. Therefore the overall effect of the ETR
is slightly progressive.
The result concerning the Gini coefficient is a consequence of several op-
posing effects: on the one hand, an environmental tax has a regressive effect,
since it increases the price of the polluting subsistence good relative to the
price of the cleaner good. Poor households are hit disproportionally hard by
this tax, since they spend a higher share of their income on polluting goods, due
8This threshold level is a consequence of the assumption that the firms allocate some of
the labor to pollution abatement (see Equation (1) and the subsequent paragraph). In Figure 4
in Section 4.3 we gradually increase ξ from zero and hence demonstrate the existence of that
threshold.
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to our assumption of non-homothetic preferences. On the other hand, the envi-
ronmental tax creates revenues which are used for redistributive purposes: the
regressive lump-sum tax is abandoned. Instead, progressive lump-sum trans-
fers are put into place. Due to the progressive effect of the lump-sum transfers,
distortionary labor subsidies for the low-income quintile and distortive income
taxes for the high income quintiles can be reduced (slightly). The overall result
is a reduction in the Gini coefficient (Figure 1, bottom left).9
Fourth, increasing the preference for environmental quality leads to an in-
crease in the environmental tax and hence to an increase in the share of envi-
ronmental tax-financed government spending. As a consequence, income taxes
are slightly reduced and lump-sum taxes are completely eliminated (Figure 1,
bottom right).
In sum, these results demonstrate that if a tax system is already optimal
(from a non-environmental view, i.e. when ξ = 0), an increase in the prefer-
ence parameter for environmental quality ξ leads to a readjustment of optimal
lump-sum transfers and income tax rates that renders the new tax system more
progressive. A government, in our model, can thus use the additional revenue
generated by environmental taxes to optimally adjust the tax system in a pro-
gressive way. We hence obtain a double dividend of redistribution even if the
pre-existing tax system is optimal from a non-environmental point of view.
Our results quantify the impact of an optimal environmental tax reform
not only on inequality, but also on optimal income tax rates and lump-sum
transfers. We thus complement the optimal taxation literature by quantifying
the change in the tax rates for different quintiles, instead of calculating the
changes in abstract tax rules.
9We use the Gini coefficient in non-environmental utility, see Section 2.3 for more details.
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Figure 1: Optimal non-linear income and lump-sum taxes, as well as the Gini
coefficient and the government spending composition before and after an envi-
ronmental tax reform. Government spending increases after the environmen-
tal tax reform since lump-sum transfers (which we include in the government
spending) increase.
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4 Robustness: lump-sum transfers, subsistence con-
sumption and greening of preferences
This section includes additional experiments to facilitate the comparison of our
results to the literature on optimal taxation in the presence of an environmental
externality. Furthermore, it illustrates the consequences of the different mod-
eling choices. In Section 4.1 we analyze the case in which uniform lump-sum
transfers are unavailable to the government (a common assumption in the lit-
erature). In Section 4.2, we analyze the role of non-homothetic preferences
by setting the subsistence level D0 to zero in all scenarios (i.e. in Sections 3
and 4.1). In Section 4.3 we vary critical parameters to analyze our results for
robustness.
Detailed results and the differences to Section 3 are elucidated in more
detail in the individual sections.
4.1 Optimal taxation without lump-sum transfers
Most articles have not considered the possibility of uniform lump-sum trans-
fers in an optimal taxation setting in the presence of an externality. Jacobs and
De Mooij (2015) is one of the few exceptions that allow for uniform lump-sum
transfers. We analyze the effect of this assumption in the current section, by
performing the same analysis as in Section 3 without the possibility of opti-
mally set uniform lump-sum transfers (taxes).10
We find that an increase in the preference parameter for environmental
quality ξ leads to the following effects: First, since lump-sum taxes are not
available to the government, redistribution of additional revenue occurs only
through the income tax system. Optimal income taxes hence react strongly
to a change in environmental preferences (see Figure 2, top left). Second,
this leads to a shift in the composition of government spending from income
towards pollution taxes (see Figure 2, bottom). Finally, the Gini coefficient
increases by more than 1 % (see Figure 2, top right).
Before the environmental tax reform, the fixed government spending re-
quirement is financed in large parts by income taxes which are set such that
the incentive constraints are binding. A smaller fraction is contributed by en-
vironmental taxes. Optimal environmental taxes are greater than zero for the
same reason as in Section 3.
Setting ξ > 0 (and above the threshold value described in Section 4.3) cre-
ates additional environmental tax revenue which is used to lower distorting
taxes. However, since the income taxes are already set such that the incentive
constraints are binding, a tax cut must always involve all households – oth-
erwise the incentive constraints would be violated. Subsidies for low-income
households increase strongly, and income taxes for high-income households
decrease more moderately – this increases the inefficiency in the tax system.
In sum, these effects lead to an increase in the Gini coefficient, since the re-
gressive effect of the environmental tax cannot be compensated completely by
an optimal adjustment of the income taxes. Uniform lump-sum taxes are hence
necessary to reduce inequality without violating the incentive constraints and
to recycle the environmental tax revenue to the households in an efficient way.
10This means all equations laid out in Section 2 remain the same, but we add the constraint
that L = 0.
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Most of the differences to Section 3 are explained by the fact that the en-
vironmental tax revenue in the current section is redistributed via income tax
cuts or income subsidies. Redistribution through the income tax system is
more distortionary since the income taxes before the ETR are already set such
that the incentive constraints are binding – the progressivity of the income tax
system can hence not be increased further to offset the regressive effect of the
environmental tax and the tax reform increases inequality. If instead lump-
sum transfers are available, as in Section 3, the government can counteract the
inequality-increasing effect of environmental taxes: uniform lump-sum trans-
fers are progressive since richer households consume more of the polluting
good in absolute terms and therefore pay more environmental taxes.
Figure 2: Optimal non-linear income taxes, the Gini coefficient and the gov-
ernment spending composition before and after an environmental tax reform
when uniform lump-sum transfers are not permitted.
4.2 The role of non-homothetic preferences
In this section we set the subsistence level of polluting consumption to zero
and hence abandon our assumption of non-homothetic preferences. The exper-
iment remains the same as in Sections 3 and 4.1: by increasing the preferences
for environmental quality from 0 to ξ > 0, we analyze the effect of an optimal
environmental tax reform on tax and transfer levels, distribution and the com-
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position of government financing. This section is hence analogous to Section
3, considering the case of homothetic preferences instead.
Non-homothetic preferences play an important role in our model: we use
them to model the fact that an environmental tax is regressive due to the ex-
istence of a subsistence level of polluting consumption (D0). The regressive
effect can be seen by comparing the Gini coefficients in Figures 1 and 3. By
setting the subsistence level to zero, we remove the regressive effect of envi-
ronmental taxation.
We find that if the government can adjust income taxes and uniform lump-
sum transfers optimally (as in Section 3), the results remain qualitatively un-
changed (see Figure 3). In particular, inequality is still decreased by an opti-
mal environmental tax reform. This is unsurprising, because we removed the
mechanism responsible for the regressivity of the environmental tax.
We observe only small differences between an environmental tax reform
when the environmental tax is assumed to be regressive (as in Section 3) and
when an environmental tax is assumed to be neutral (as in the current section).
This means that, if an optimizing government has access to both lump-sum and
non-linear income taxes, an environmental tax reform, even if the environmen-
tal tax itself is assumed to be regressive, can be adjusted such that it is slightly
progressive.
Figure 3: Optimal non-linear income and lump-sum taxes, as well as the Gini
coefficient and the government spending composition before and after an en-
vironmental tax reform when preferences are homothetic (i.e. D0 = 0).
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4.3 Parameter sensitivity and greening of preferences
In this section we analyze the sensitivity of our main results in Section 3 to
variations in key parameters such as the elasticity of substitution between labor
and pollution (σ ), the level of government spending (G), the share of labor in
the polluting sector εD and the preference parameter for environmental quality
(ξ ). Except for an elasticity of substitution between labor and pollution above
0.98, we find that the results remain qualitatively unchanged. The detailed
results of the sensitivity analysis are available upon request from the authors.
We vary σ , the elasticity of substitution between labor and pollution, be-
tween 0.2 and 0.999. We find that the changes in the optimal tax schemes
remain qualitatively the same. However, the result concerning the Gini co-
efficient depends on σ : an environmental tax reform slightly reduces the Gini
coefficient for σ between 0.2 and 0.98. It increases the Gini coefficient slightly
if σ ≥ 0.99. The detailed results are displayed in Table 3.
σ Gini (before ETR) Gini (after ETR)
0.2 0.2551 0.2358
0.5 0.2644 0.2582
0.8 0.2648 0.2633
0.999 0.2649 0.2650
Table 3: Sensitivity of the Gini coefficient from Section 3 to changes in the
elasticity between labor and pollution. The highlighted case is our benchmark
calibration.
We set the level of government spending G at 5 in the benchmark calibra-
tion (this corresponds to roughly 24 % of GDP before the tax reform). In order
to assess the impact of varying this parameter, we analyze two extreme values:
zero and 15. We find that the results do not change qualitatively. The level of
government spending mainly influences the level of the lump-sum transfers: If
G = 15, lump-sum transfers are negative, since the government uses them to
raise revenue. If G = 0, lump-sum transfers are well above zero since they are
used to return additional revenue to the households.
The share of labor in the polluting sector is εD = 0.92 in the benchmark sce-
nario. The results concerning inequality and optimal income tax schedules do
not change qualitatively when εD is varied. However, the government spend-
ing composition reacts strongly to this parameter: Lower values of εD (e.g.
εD = 0.7) lead to a higher use of pollution in the production sector and thus to
more government revenue through environmental taxes. This increase in gov-
ernment revenue induces a shift in the composition of government spending.
The effect of the preference for environmental quality can be illustrated by
gradually increasing the parameter ξ . Figure 4 displays the optimal environ-
mental tax as a function of ξ . For values of ξ between zero and 0.005, the
environmental tax does not react to an increase in ξ . This explains the fact that
a government sets a positive environmental tax even if ξ = 0: up to a certain
threshold level the firms do not react to an increase in the environmental tax
and the government hence sets the environmental tax at this level. This thresh-
old level is a consequence of the assumption that the firms allocate some of the
labor to pollution abatement (see Equation 1 and the subsequent paragraph).
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Figure 4: The effect of a gradual increase of the preference for environmental
quality on the optimal environmental tax level. There is a threshold at ξ =
0.005 from which on the optimal environmental tax reacts to an increase in ξ .
5 The case of a calibrated pre-existing tax system
Recently, it has been of great concern that inequality rises to levels that may
be harmful to societies (OECD, 2011): governments may fail to set taxes ade-
quately to counteract undesirable levels of income inequality (Piketty, 2014).11
This section applies the theoretical framework from Section 3 to a real-
world setting with suboptimally high inequality. Instead of comparing optimal
taxation scenarios as in the preceding sections, we calibrate the model to the
actual income tax schedule of the U.S. economy (see Section 5.1 for details
on the calibration). This implies that in the initial scenario both the pollution
externality is undertaxed and there is too little redistribution. This constitutes a
very stylized scenario for examining real-world inequality levels. The purpose
of this section is to give insights on actual policy debates about the distribu-
tional impacts of environmental tax reforms.
We additionally assume that the government is constrained to three realis-
tic designs of an environmental tax reform: additional revenue can be recycled
either via non-linear income tax cuts, via linear income tax cuts, or through
uniform lump-sum transfers (the different scenarios are outlined in detail in
Section 5.2).12 Within this setting we compare the equity impacts of three de-
signs of an ETR, when the preferences for environmental quality are increased
from zero to ξ > 0.
Our main two results are as follows: First, we show that revenue recycling
via non-linear income tax cuts and through uniform lump-sum transfers re-
duces inequality below initial levels. We call this effect the double dividend of
redistribution. It occurs when inequality levels decrease through an environ-
11While some kinds of inequality may indeed be detrimental for society, others motivate
people to work harder, and can be beneficial (Marrero and Rodríguez, 2013). However, there
seems to be evidence that inequality itself can have a negative effect on efficiency (Berg et al.,
2012; Kumhof et al., 2015). At least for this reason, assuming suboptimally high levels of
inequality is thus a credible premise and inequality-reduction a frequent policy goal.
12We refrain from displaying the results of revenue recycling through a combination of lump-
sum transfers and non-linear income tax cuts, since it leads to the same outcome as the scenario
with only non-linear income tax cuts. The reason for that is that the government uses all the
environmental tax revenue to mitigate inequality in the income tax system and hence has no use
for lump-sum transfers.
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mental tax reform.13 Second, we demonstrate that the optimal environmental
tax rate depends on how the environmental tax revenue is recycled. For de-
tailed results see Section 5.3.
These results have strong political consequences: In a calibrated scenario,
in which inequality is suboptimally high, and in which the government cannot
observe the individuals’ skill levels, a government should not set a lower-than-
optimal environmental tax out of distributional concerns. The optimal tax we
refer to is the optimal environmental tax from Section 3, in which the gov-
ernment adjusts income, lump-sum and environmental taxes simultaneously.
Instead, a government should combine an optimal environmental tax with a
progressive revenue-recycling mechanism, in order to reduce inequality and
enhance environmental quality at the same time.
5.1 Calibration of the suboptimal income tax system
In this section, instead of determining the optimal income tax in the initial sce-
nario, we use recent U.S. data on income taxation to perform a similar analysis
as in Section 3 in a calibrated framework. The individual income tax rates are
given in Table 4. These tax rates do not only include individual income taxes,
but also corporate income taxes, social insurance taxes and excise taxes. For
the sake of simplicity we refer to the sum of these taxes as the income tax. The
remaining parameters are given in Section 2.1.
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Income tax (τ0w,i) 0.015 0.072 0.115 0.156 0.24
Table 4: The pre-existing income tax rates are taken from the 2013 report of
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2013)
5.2 Revenue recycling scenarios
The purpose of this section is to describe the revenue recycling scenarios used
in Section 5.3. The scenarios differ in the way the additional revenue of an
environmental tax reform is returned to the households.
The tax system before the increase in the preference for environmental
quality is described by the pre-existing income tax τ0w,i, given by the model
calibration described in Section 5.1, the pre-existing environmental tax τ0Z and
the absence of lump-sum transfers (i.e. L = 0).
The increase in the preference for environmental quality leads to an in-
crease in the optimal environmental tax level from τ0Z to τZ . The additional
environmental tax revenue can be returned to the households through the fol-
lowing recycling mechanisms:
13This concept is different, however, from the concept of the environmental double dividend
in the sense of Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg (1999): In models with only one representative
household such a (weak) dividend can occur, when recycling through income tax cuts is more
efficient than lump-sum recycling. A strong double dividend, that is an increase in economic
efficiency, can only occur with an inefficient pre-existing tax system. In our setting, there is also
an increase in GDP (see Figure 5, bottom) because the pre-existing income tax schedule creates
an inefficient labor supply.
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1. Non-linear income tax cuts: In this scenario the government endoge-
nously determines the optimal income tax cut τw,i < 0. Lump-sum trans-
fers are zero, and the government’s maximization problem then is
max
τw,i,τZ
W s.t. Eq. (12) and G =
N
∑
i=1
(τ0w,i + τw,i)φiw(T − li)+ τZZ.
The auxiliary function H in the households’ first-order conditions (see
Appendix A Equations 17 - 19) changes accordingly:
H (w, pD,τ0w,i,τw,i) = ((1− τ0w,i− τw,i)φiwT − pDD0).
2. Linear income tax cuts: The tax revenues are redistributed via linear
income tax cuts. Lump-sum transfers are equal to zero and the equations
are analogous to the case of non-linear income tax cuts only with τw,i =
τw < 0.
3. Lump-sum transfers: we model household heterogeneity explicitly and
uniform lump-sum transfers L to each income class are hence a realistic
revenue-recycling mechanism. In this case the government maximiza-
tion problem reads:
max
L,τZ
W s.t. Eq. (12) and G =−NL+
N
∑
i=1
τ0w,iφiw(T − li)+ τZZ.
Again, the auxiliary function H in the households’ first-order conditions
(see Appendix A Equations 17 - 19) changes accordingly:
H (w, pD,τ0w,i,L) = ((1− τ0w,i)φiwT +L− pDD0).
5.3 Results
In this section, we compare three environmental tax revenue recycling sce-
narios, in which the government has a preference for environmental quality ξ
greater than zero, to the case of ξ = 0. Furthermore, we compare the three sce-
narios against each other in terms of their equity impacts and their implications
for the tax system.
The main mechanism through which an environmental tax acts on the dis-
tribution remains unchanged: poor households cannot substitute clean for pol-
luting consumption as freely as high-income households, due to our assump-
tion of non-homothetic preferences.
The main results are: First, the Gini coefficient (see Figure 5, middle left)
is strongly reduced by non-linear income tax cuts, closely followed by uniform
lump-sum transfers (i.e. both recycling mechanisms lead to a double dividend
of redistribution). Linear income tax cuts, by contrast, increase the Gini co-
efficient slightly, compared to the initial scenario. It can be seen from the top
left graph of Figure 5 that rich households benefit relatively more from linear
income tax cuts than poor households. The opposite is true for non-linear in-
come tax cuts. Since rich households pay a higher total share of taxes, uniform
lump-sum redistribution is also progressive. Second, the optimal environmen-
tal tax depends on the way the tax revenues are returned to the households.
In the top right graph of Figure 5 we see a correlation between the progres-
sivity of the recycling mechanism and the optimal level of the environmental
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tax: more progressive recycling leads to higher optimal environmental taxes.
Third, we additionally obtain an environmental double dividend in the sense
of Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg (1999): Setting the environmental tax at its
optimal level yields revenues which are used to optimally adjust the inefficient
initial income tax schedule, which increases the GDP (see Figure 5, bottom).
Figure 5: Effect a greening of the government’s preferences for environmental
quality on income taxes, optimal environmental tax levels, the Gini coefficient,
the composition of government spending and GDP. The case of non-optimal
pre-existing income taxes. We compare three designs of an environmental tax
reform.
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6 Conclusion
We analyze the effects of an optimal environmental tax reform when envi-
ronmental taxation is regressive. Specifically, we quantify the distributional
impacts and changes in the optimal tax structure induced by an optimal envi-
ronmental tax reform. For this purpose it is necessary to combine key elements
from several literature strands: Mirrleesian income taxation in the presence of
an externality (as in Cremer et al. 1998 and Jacobs and De Mooij 2015), com-
paring different design options for environmental tax reforms (as in Kaplow
2012) and determining the distributional impacts of an environmental tax re-
form when accounting for price effects, outside the optimum (as in Fullerton
and Heutel 2007, 2010).
An environmental tax reform has distributional impacts both on the house-
hold side and on the firm side. Assessing the distributional impacts of such
a reform hence requires accounting for all these effects. Our model therefore
combines a household side as in a traditional optimal taxation model with an
optimizing firm side as in models that focus exclusively on price effects out-
side the optimum. Our study is the first to analyze the distributional effects of
optimal environmental tax reforms in a setting which combines both firm-side
and household-side distributional effects.
We analyze two different scenarios: first, a scenario in which the tax sys-
tem before the environmental tax reform is optimal from a non-environmental
point of view. Second, a scenario in which the tax system before the envi-
ronmental tax reform is calibrated to U.S. data (and inequality is suboptimally
high) and in which the government is constrained to different revenue recy-
cling options. We show that, in the first scenario, the regressive effect of the
environmental tax can be largely or even completely offset by the revenue re-
cycling (depending on the available revenue recycling mechanisms). In the
second scenario, we show that inequality can be reduced significantly if the en-
vironmental tax revenue is recycled either lump-sum, or through a progressive
income tax reform. Furthermore, we demonstrate that more progressive recy-
cling leads to higher optimal environmental taxes. Whenever an environmental
tax reform reduces inequality a double dividend of redistribution occurs.
These findings have important political consequences: an environmental
tax reform can reduce inequality below initial levels by simple measures such
as recycling the revenue as per-capita cash transfers. Even higher distributional
gains can be achieved by an environmental tax-financed (budget-neutral) pro-
gressive reform of the income tax system. However, this policy might be less
feasible politically.
Possible extensions include performing a similar analysis in an intertem-
poral setting, accounting for structural changes in the economy, and taking the
difference in factor ownership of the income quintiles into account. Further-
more, since an equitable income distribution might also be seen as a public
good (Thurow, 1971), it may be worthwhile to endogenize public consump-
tion (as in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1994, 1996) and to analyze possible
trade-offs between these two public goods.
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A First-order conditions of households and firms
Households:
By combining the households’ first-order conditions with their budget equa-
tion, the following explicit demand functions can be derived:
Ci =
α
pC (α +β + γ )
H (w, pD,τw,i,L), (17)
Di =
β
pD(α +β + γ )
H (w, pD,τw,i,L)+D0 (18)
li =
γ
(α +β + γ )(1− τw,i)φiwH (w, pD,τw,i,L), (19)
with
H (w, pD,τw,i,L) = ((1− τw,i)φiwT +L− pDD0). (20)
Firms:
Maximizing profits of both firms yields four first-order conditions:
w =
∂Fj (Tj,Z j)
∂Tj
= ε jT (r−1)j F
(1−r)
j p j, (21)
τZ =
∂FC (TC,ZC)
∂ZC
= (1− ε j)Z (r−1)j F (1−r)j p j, (22)
with j ∈ {C,D}.
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